The objectives are empirically analyzed using the Granger causality test and establish the link between household saving and economic growth.
The picture of a benign South-South alliance that challenges the neoliberal global North fails to understand the way in which all economies have an impetus to accumulate and are linked by and locked into a process of competitive accumulation.
When competition is placed at the centre of analysis a more complex picture of South-South relations emerges.
In Brazil, for example, while exports to China have helped its economy to negotiate the economic crisis relatively unscathed so far, the 40 percent appreciation of the Brazilian real against the dollar in the last two years has made domestically produced goods uncompetitive.
A further problem for the Link between household saving and economic growth economics essay South is that foreign investment has been diverted from other industrialising economies to China.
It is locked into similar competitive interdependencies with other major capitalist economies and their ruling classes, and with the US in particular. However, more importantly, they are part of a set of deepening interdependencies between China and the core capitalist economies.
This was vividly illustrated at the end of October when China exhorted the EU to solve its debt crisis and when the EU in turn went running to China to ask for a contribution towards its bail-out fund for the eurozone.
The dollar-renminbi exchange rate has produced significant skirmishes between the ruling classes of the US and China as they strive for competitive advantage. Washington has complained that this gives Chinese firms an unfair advantage and demanded that the renminbi is allowed to float freely on the exchange markets, which would lead to a substantial revaluation of the Chinese currency.
In July the Chinese government announced that the renminbi would be allowed to appreciate somewhat against the dollar. In the wake of the crisis the exchange rate was frozen between andbut appreciation has again been allowed since early This spilled over into heightened tensions in October when the US Senate passed a bill that would impose tariffs on imports from countries that undervalued their currencies.
But the American deficit cannot expand indefinitely. July saw a poisonous stand-off between two sections of the US ruling class over its ballooning debt. As the global economy continues to falter, tensions between the US and China have intensified.
These are likely to deepen and multiply as the two powers grapple with the contradictions of their strategies of accumulation. And, as history shows, economic competition dovetails with political and military rivalry. But the geographical and social space within which states can claim legitimate decision-making force is limited for, as this journal has long highlighted, states operate within a system of many states.
States do not, however, meekly accept the national limits of their power but seek to shape the external environment, within the limits of their own resources, by influencing international processes and the domestic politics of other states. It has settled a dozen border disputes with its neighbours over the last decade, and has improved relations with Taiwan since the victory of Ma Ying-jeou from its traditional enemy the Kuomintang in the March presidential election.
On its northern and western borders China was a co-founder of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which also includes Russia and the Central Asian republics—Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
Further afield China has assumed a growing role in UN peacekeeping and humanitarian missions and now makes the largest peacekeeping contribution of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.
But these agreements are only one side of their relations and China and India increasingly appear to be locked into a dynamic of rival alliance construction. As a result, India has undertaken a major revision of its foreign and strategic policy. The half century or so after Indian independence in was characterised by mistrust between India and the US.
Given that the US currently owns 12 of the 15 aircraft carriers afloat, and puts them to regular use in its imperialist wars and global power projection, this latter development poses a potentially serious long-term challenge to US global supremacy. Energy imports are particularly vulnerable: China currently imports over half the oil it consumes and is likely to increase this, according to US estimates, to nearly three quarters by The bulk of these imports arrive via tanker from the Middle East and Africa.
While China is seeking to diversify energy supplies and supply routes for instance via the construction of a gas pipeline from Burma and recently opened oil pipelines from Russia and Kazakhstan its rulers recognise the vulnerability of extended supply routes to hostile naval actions.
Beyond Taiwan, the US uses Guam as its key air and naval base in the Western Pacific, while Japan provides a base albeit not without provoking nationalist indignation for US troops, nuclear submarines and long-range bombers, and has been working with the US for over a decade on the development of a high-tech theatre missile defence TMD system.
We are, however, arguing that rivalries between national ruling classes produce an inescapable logic of competitive war preparation and geopolitical tension that both diminishes the resources available to satisfy pressing human needs and contains an ever-present danger of armed conflict.
The relations between the states come to resemble the double helix of the DNA structure. The Chinese model has intensified inequalities of wealth with 1 percent of top income households owning 40 percent of the total wealth in the US 5 percent of people own 60 percent of wealth.
This has been reflected in badly built schools that collapsed during the earthquake of and scandals about adulterated food. Chinese workers have proved to be far from docile or acquiescent. In social unrest had a different complexion. Rather than involving the relatively well educated, higher-paid migrant workers of Japanese subsidiaries, the common thread linking these incidents was the wider social status and vulnerable position of migrant workers.
These protests were not based in the workplace, but expressed the cumulative anger of this group of super-exploited workers, which exploded in huge riots.
In June Guangdong, the southern heartland of China which accounts for roughly one third of exports, was rocked by a large and violent protest.
In Zengcheng three days of riots and running street battles erupted after a 20 year old pregnant street vendor was manhandled by government security guards to stop her selling her goods outside a supermarket. Some 10, people attacked police property and burned and overturned armoured vehicles—6, police were deployed to get the protest under control.
The huge growth of the economy over the last 30 years has been driven by rapid urbanisation and a seemingly endless supply of cheap migrant workers from the countryside to the cities. The OECD reports that, bymillion people had been drawn into urban areas through official and unofficial migration to work in the factories, construction sites and restaurants.This paper documents the sources of data used in the construction of the estimates of the Levy Institute Measure of Economic Wellbeing (LIMEW) for the years , , , , , , , , , , , and Also, dealing with the relationship between domestic savings and economic growth for various economies with different income levels, Mohan () concluded using cross section data from to and Granger causality methodology, that economic growth rate Granger caused savings growth rate in eight high income countries (HIC)-Sweden, Iceland, Finland, UK, Korea, Japan, Canada, and Norway- .
show that there is a long-run causal relationship between savings and economic growth, and between saving and non-oil economic growth, and that these relations are two-way. Most working papers and journal articles on cross countries studies assume a positive relationship between household saving and economic growth and an adverse relationship between consumer debt and economic growth.
The slower growth rate in GDS has mainly been due to decline in household financial saving from % of GDP in to 8 per cent of GDP in , private corporate saving sector from % of GDP in to % in and that of public sector saving from per cent in to per cent in JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary sources.